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 Emerging markets usually have weaker legal and governance environment. 
The weaker enforcement of investor protection laws leads to a poor 
information environment. Using data of all the listed non-financial firms 
from Pakistan stock exchange (PSX), we document the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and stock price informativeness. The results 
from two-stage least squares (2SLS) reveal that controlling shareholders in 
the form of block holding plays an effective role in improving 
informativeness. Due to the presence of these block ownership, the 
institutional investors remain largely short term investors and act passively. 
This behavior of institutional investors encourages managers to extract more 
cash flows leading to higher synchronicity. These findings suggest market 
regulators develop such a corporate governance mechanism that not only 
ensures investor protection but also advise firms to reduce information 
asymmetry by better disclosure and transparency. More specifically, in the 
Pakistani context, traditional corporate governance mechanisms through 
board room regulations may not improve informativeness, and regulators 
need to regulate the ownership regulations, including family ownership and 
controlling shareholders.   
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1. Introduction 
For many years, the role of effective corporate governance in reducing information asymmetry between firms’ 
managers and its shareholders remained a major focus among researchers and policymakers. Audit failures and 
corporate scandals like Enron and Worldcom, have increased focus on enhancing information disclosure and 
transparency through effective corporate governance (Chen et al., 2017). Stock prices reflect information about firm 
fundamentals and markets as well. The more a firm’s stock price movement is based on its fundamentals, the better its 
price informativeness. Roll (1988), in his seminal study,  finds “the extent to which stock prices move together 
depends on the relative amount of firm-specific and market-level information impounded in stock prices.” Emerging 
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markets usually have weaker corporate governance and hence have poor information environment (Morck et al., 
2000). Extant literature establishes that stock prices depict more firm-specific information in markets with better 
property rights protection, investor protection, and a better governance environment (Alves et al., 2010; Dasgupta et 
al., 2010; Jin & Myers, 2006). These mechanisms are either weak or absent in emerging markets. In the absence of 
these mechanisms, the information environment and disclosure culture remain poor in such markets (Balasubramanian 
et al., 2010). This poor information environment remains a fundamental problem in emerging markets. Poor 
information environment has severe consequences for market participants, especially for emerging markets. 
Information asymmetry causes stock price movements that may be unrelated to firm fundamentals, thus results in over 
or undervaluation (Roll, 1988). Investors are exposed to greater risk ((Campbell et al., 2001), have lower investment 
efficiency (Chen et al., 2006) due the presence of information asymmetry in the market. 
 
Pakistan is one of the fast-growing emerging financial markets in the world (Arshad et al., 2016). Mostly, the firms in 
emerging markets are usually owned, managed and also controlled by the insiders. The biggest shareholder is often 
the board chairperson, which is one of the reasons for ineffective traditional governance mechanisms in these markets 
(Rehman et al., 2012). In the case of Pakistan, it is being observed that most firms are controlled and managed by 
families which may lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders (Sheikh et al., 2018). Earlier studies by Durnev 
and Kim (2005), and Love and Klapper (2002) proposed that corporate governance practices matter the most in 
countries having weaker investor protection and governance system.  
 
Less informative markets provide an opportunity to informed traders to earn abnormal returns (Budsaratragoon et al., 
2014). As indicated by De Long et al. (1990),  stock prices experience higher market-wide stock price variations 
unrelated to firm fundamentals due to increased market-wide noise trader risk resulted from reduced informed trading.  
Corporate governance can play an important role in decreasing this information asymmetry and improving 
transparency (Budsaratragoon et al., 2014). Different corporate governance aspects improve the information 
environment. For instance,  Boubaker et al. (2014) found controlling shareholders decreases informativeness, Gul et 
al. (2010) observed that concentrated ownership increase synchronicity while foreign shareholding reduces 
synchronicity. Feng et al. (2016) found the separation of control and ownership rights creates agency issues among 
controlling and minority shareholders reducing informativeness. Kun et al. (2017) found that the presence of 
institutional investors increase informativeness because they have an information advantage over individual investors.  
An and Zhang (2013) find long term investments of institutional investors increased informativeness, while the short 
term investment behavior causes a reduction in informativeness. Luo et al. (2014) document a positive relationship 
between institutional shareholding and informativeness. 
 
On the other hand, DeLisle et al. (2017) proposed a rise in passive institutional investors for the last couple of 
decades, which have negative implications for market efficiency. Kim and Zhang (2016) found independent directors 
reduce information asymmetry and solve agency problems. The literature documents a strong link between corporate 
governance and firm’s price informativeness; however, what aspects and elements of corporate governance 
contributing towards reducing information asymmetry remain inconclusive. 
 
Pakistan is an emerging market and has unique characteristics. In Pakistan, most firms are controlled and managed by 
families which may lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders (Sheikh et al., 2018). Moreover, Pakistan’s 
legal and political system is weaker, and the overall governance environment is poor (Rehman et al., 2012). This 
study investigates how these unique settings of corporate governance influence the firms’ information environment. 
 
To measure stock price informativeness, the present study uses R2 from a modified model using contemporaneous 
returns. Further, to overcome the bounded properties of R2, we use logarithmic transformation (Gul et al., 2010; 
Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). To address issues like endogeneity, the study also uses fixed effects estimators. 
 
This study has useful insights for the security analysts, investment bankers, and auditors who continuously monitor 
companies as the quality and size of information add or destroy the long term firm’s value.  This study is also 
potentially informative for regulators and policymakers as it defines the role of corporate governance in improving the 
information environment, which is an important tool of investor protection. Further, we document the relationship 
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between corporate governance variables and firm information environment in unique settings of emerging markets. 
The earlier literature on this subject is limited to developed markets and has limited implications for emerging 
economies like Pakistan.  
2. Literature Review  
Financial economists argue a strong association between a firm’s stock performance and the quality of the firm’s 
directors. Further research finds firms with a large portion of outside directors serving one more other boards found 
mediocre future performance and lowers the value of firms stock (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Fairchild and Li (2005) 
found no relationship between the categories of directors whether to hire outside directors of the firm or director of 
acquired firm and stock market performance of those firms. We expect board size and the presence of independent 
directors reduce synchronicity.  
 
Corporate governance features have different possible effects on stock price synchronicity. Boubaker et al. (2014) find 
stock price synchronicity increases through increased controlling by the shareholders. Gul et al. (2010) investigated 
the impact of concentrated ownership on stock price synchronicity. Synchronicity is higher in circumstances when a 
large number of shareholders related to the government. This paper also examined the inverse relation of 
synchronicity with foreign ownership and auditor quality. Our study expects an inverse relationship of concentrated 
ownership with stock price informativeness.  
 
Ding et al. (2017), using data for the Chinese listed firms, found that analyst coverage restricts managers from 
withholding firm-specific information, thus improve the information environment. They also observed improved stock 
price informativeness in the presence of developed financial intermediaries and less government expropriation but the 
reduced role of analyst coverage in informativeness. Apart from corporate boards, regional institutions also play an 
important role in shaping corporate policy.  
 
Institutional investors have the power to change the firm and engage their recourses to enhance the firm’s corporate 
governance. Institutional characteristics play an important role in increasing stock price informativeness. In a unique 
province-level institutional characteristic, Hasan et al. (2014) found that developed legal and political institutions 
ensured more informative stock prices. Political pluralism, better property rights and rules of law reduce stock price 
synchronicity.  
 
The investment behaviour of institutional investors also contributes towards firm’s informativeness. From one 
perspective, short term institutional investors focus on short term gains having high portfolio turnover. In such cases, 
they don’t have strong incentives to collect firm-specific information, thus have no role in improving the information 
environment (An & Zhang, 2013). Moreover, this short-term behavior encourages herd behavior in the market by 
buying and selling on trends which increases the stock price synchronicity (Jin et al., 2016).  Then again, when the 
institutional investors maintain larger stakes for a long time, they have larger incentives to closely monitor their 
investment portfolio. Shleifer and Vishny (1987) suggested that because the size, institutional investors have the 
power to monitors and promote the best practices of corporate governance.  
 
Stock price synchronicity is negatively related to the firm’s ownership by committed institutional investors. The 
committed institutional investors have a strong benefit of monitoring because of their heavy investments (An & 
Zhang, 2013). Their findings suggest institutional investor’s monitoring limits the cash extraction of managers, which 
helps to reduce firm-specific risk, and due to this R-squared is lower.  Sometimes, these institutional investors took a 
large position having representation on the firm’s board. Therefore, long term institutional investors improve firm 
information environment and reduce stock price synchronicity (An & Zhang, 2013).  
 
Kun et al. (2017) found institutional shareholders help in reducing synchronicity and improving information 
efficiency. The improvement in information efficiency is mainly due to long term investments by institutional 
investors. Therefore, policymakers and regulators should encourage long term investment that results in improved 
resource allocation in the stock market. DeLisle et al. (2017) proposed a rise in passive institutional investors since the 
last couple of decades. This rise in institutional holding has negative implications for market efficiency.  Passive 
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institutional usually do not trade around firm-specific news and thus result in reducing firm-specific price 
informativeness.  
 
Luo et al. (2014) used intraday data from the Japanese market to investigate the role of institutional investors in 
increasing price informativeness. They proposed that institutional investors have better access to information than 
retail investors. The presence of institutional investors improve firm’s information environment. Moreover, this 
positive relationship is stronger among firms having foreign institutional investors.  
 
Brockman and Yan (2009) examined the impact of the block holder on the firm’s information. Previously studies 
show the cost to obtain private information effects on stock price efficiency. Block holders have an advantage over 
disperse shareholders as they can acquire private information with minimum cost. Ye et al. (2018) used synchronicity 
as a measure of informativeness using a large sample from 1984-2014 in US market. They find improved 
informativeness for firms that are strategically deviated from the relative industry. This improvement is more 
pronounced in a firm having more block holders. These results are robust to change in the measure of informativeness 
and other controls. 
3. Data and Methodology   
The study uses data from all the listed non-financial firms in Pakistan stock exchange (formerly Karachi stock 
exchange) for the period of 2009 to 2017. We exclude all the financial firms due to the highly regulated environment 
and different contextual settings, especially separate corporate governance guidelines. Further, PSX observed a floor 
in prices in 2008, which resulted in limited trading activities. The prices could move upward within a prescribed range 
but could not move below the level from the day of the imposition of the floor. This limited trading makes difficult 
price discovery phenomena, thus disturbing the market efficiency1, so this study also explores the information 
environment after the imposition of the floor. The final sample contains an unbalanced panel of 264 non-financial 
firms from 12 broad sectors listed in PSX having 2335 firm-year observations. To include in a sample, a firm 
essentially has at least three years of continuous data during the sample period, and firms listed after 2016 are 
excluded based on this criterion. Following Gul et al. (2010), we use R2 from following the market model to measure 
the stock price synchronicity.  
       𝑅𝑖 𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑚 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡                           (1) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of firm i at time t, 𝑅𝑚 𝑡 is the market return at t, 𝛼𝑖, and 𝛽𝑖 𝑡 are estimated parameters and 𝜀𝑖 𝑡 
represents error term. This study uses the logistic transformation of R2 obtained from the above equation (1) to 
overcome the restricted nature of R2 within 0 and 1(Yeung & Lento, 2018).  
 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖  𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑅𝑖 𝑡
2
1− 𝑅𝑖 𝑡
2 )                             (2) 
 
This study uses individual measures of corporate governance which theoretically play an important role in the flow of 
information.  
 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             
     (3) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 is firm-level price synchronicity which is measured by R2 of market model regression using equation 
1, CEO shows a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the same as the chairman, BS shows board size, BCOM 
shows board composition,  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁 represents institutional investors, BLOCK represents block shareholders.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
                                                          
1 Report of the Committee: Study of the Pakistan Stock Market Crisis of 2008, (June 05, 2015) 
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the model. The average value of R2 for the sample 
is .08 which is consistent with the Roll (1969) who argued that lower R2 is associated with stock prices reflect a large 
amount of firm-specific variations as compared to market variations. Similar to Chen et al. (2007) and An and Zhang 
(2013), we also observe a lower value of synchronicity (SYNCH) having a mean value of -3.87. Board Size (BSIZE) 
has a mean value of 8 with Board Independence (BCOM) mean of 62.15%. The institutional shareholding 
(INSTOWN) stands at 15.9% showing lesser presence of institutional shareholding. The controlling shareholder 
(BLOCK) shows a mean value of 2.39 showing the presence of large controlling shareholders among our sample 
firms. The control variables also show some distinct patterns. Family ownership (FAMILY) has a mean value of .76 
showing presence of family-owned firms in Pakistan. Firm size (FSIZE) has a mean value of 8.43, Leverage (LEV) 
has a mean value of .36 showing a moderate level of firms financed by debt. Market to book (MB) shows a mean 
value of 1.47, firm age (AGE) has a mean value of 38 years, and profitability (ROA) has a mean of 3.8%.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
R2 2335 0.08 0.108 .00000035 0.6466 
SYNCH 2335 -3.87 2.42 -11.57 -0.17 
CEO 2335 0.18 0.38 0 1 
BSIZE 2335 8.00 1.54 5 16 
BCOM 2335 62.15 17.27 28.57 90 
INSTOWN 2335 .159 0.19 0 .92 
BLOCK 2335 2.39 1.94 0 9 
FAMILY 2335 .76 0.43 0 1 
FSIZE 2335 8.43 1.7 3.86 13.34 
LEV 2335 .36 12.3 -593.03 3.74 
MB 2335 1.47 2.93 -2.13 21.42 
AGE 2335 38.23 21.4 2 157 
ROA 2335 .038 4.87 -54.08 214.19 
 
Table 2. Correlation 
 
SYNCH CEO BSIZE BCOM INST BLOCK FAMILY FSIZE LEV MB AGE ROA 
SYNCH 1.00 
           
CEO -0.15 1.00 
          
BSIZE 0.22 -0.15 1.00 
         
BCOM 0.05 -0.12 0.11 1.00 
        
INSTOWN 0.19 -0.11 0.17 -0.01 1.00 
       
BLOCK -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 1.00 
      
FAMILY -0.20 0.11 -0.33 -0.05 -0.21 0.12 1.00 
     
FSIZE 0.43 -0.11 0.42 0.017 0.23 -0.05 -0.26 1.00 
    
LEV 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.005 0.003 0.02 -0.01 0.03 1.00 
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MB 0.05 -0.13 0.13 -0.11 0.06 -0.06 -0.16 0.11 0.0082 1.00 
  
AGE -0.02 -0.04 0.14 -0.030 0.01 -0.07 -0.19 0.11 0.0161 0.1617 1.00 
 
ROA 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 
Notes: The table reports Pearson pairwise correlation between all variables defined previously. 
 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 reports the correlation between all variables used in equation 3. CEO, BLOCK, FAMILY, and AGE are 
negatively correlated with the SYNCH, while BSIZE, BCOM, INSTOWN, FSIZE, LEV, MB and ROA are positively 
associated with synchronicity. This table also serves as a simple test of multicollinearity among the explanatory 
variables. It is clear from the table that none of the variables has a high correlation suggesting no signs of 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. In addition to correlation, we also used the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) as a test of multicollinearity and found similar results.   
 
4.3 Regression Results 
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results of corporate governance and synchronicity. The results find a negative 
relationship between CEO duality on firm informativeness. This statistically significant relationship is consistent with 
the notion when the CEO is also the board chairman; he has the incentive to increase the transparency of the firm 
(Methew et al., 2015). Our board variables, i.e., board size and board independence, have a positive but insignificant 
relationship with the synchronicity. This argument of a larger board is associated with less informativeness, which is 
in line with the Jensen (1993) free-rider effect. Larger boards have less candid discussions on critical issues, which 
lead to poor monitoring and hence poor informativeness. Moreover, board size and board composition do not 
contribute positively in Pakistan.  
 
Turning towards ownership, we find a positive relation between institutional ownership and price informativeness. 
The cause for this positive relationship can result from two reasons. First, sometimes institutional investors enter the 
equity market only to put their extra cash flows, or they are not actively exercising their monitoring role, which leads 
to a poor information environment. Second, when the institutional investors own small stakes or focus on short term 
gains, they have less incentive to involve in the active monitoring of the firm leading to poor information environment 
(Bogle 2019 and An 2013).  
 
We find a negative relationship between block holders and synchronicity. As discussed earlier, ownership in emerging 
markets is often in the hands of large blocks having control over decision making (Rehman et al., 2012). These 
majority controlling shareholders have large incentives to monitor the firm. The active monitoring by the controlling 
shareholders limits the managers’ discretion and extraction of cash flows, which leads to better informativeness. 
Consistent with these arguments, family firms also have strong monitoring by the family members on the board and 
management as well; hence there is also an inverse relationship between family ownership and synchronicity.  
   
Table 3: Regression Analysis 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH Coefficients Std. Error t-statistics 
CEO -.5917*** 
(0.000) 
.1204 -4.91 
BSIZE .0171 
(0.603) 
.0330 0.52 
BCOM .0031 
(0.228) 
.0026 1.21 
INSTOWN .9268*** 
(0.000) 
.2069 4.48 
BLOCK -.0889*** 
(0.000) 
.0239 -3.72 
FAMILY -.4439*** 
(0.000) 
.1093 -4.06 
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FSIZE .5597*** 
(0.000) 
.0288 19.44 
LEV -.0015*** 
(0.000) 
.0003 -5.79 
MB -.0089 
(0.512) 
.0135 -0.66 
AGE -.0107*** 
(0.000) 
.0019 -5.38 
ROA .0034** 
(0.025) 
.0015354 2.25 
C -7.994*** 
(0.000) 
.3574765 -22.36 
N 2335 F-Statitics 96.78 
R2 .226 p>F .000 
 
For other control variables, our results are consistent with the previous research of An and Zhang (2013) and Hutton 
et al. (2009). The firm size shows a positive relationship with synchronicity. The large and profitable firms have 
diverse operations, thus have higher synchronicity or poor informativeness. Leverage has a negative effect on 
synchronicity as debt plays an important monitoring role and improves informativeness. Similarly, older firms have 
better information environment and exhibit lower synchronicity. 
 
We further add industry and year fixed effects in the main regression models and results are reported in Table 4. The 
results are almost the same as reported earlier, except the market to book ratio (MB) which turned to negative. The 
findings suggests that firms having a higher market to book ratio and growth potential have more firm-specific 
informativeness as compared to their counterparts (Hutton et al., 2009).   
 
Table 4: Industry and Year Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH Coefficients. Std. Error t-statistics 
CEO -.2903** 
(0.012) 
.1159 -2.51 
BSIZE -.0232 
(0.456) 
.0312 -0.75 
BCOM .0016 
(0.504) 
.0024 0.67 
INSTOWN .5135*** 
(0.009) 
.1954 2.63 
BLOCK -.0458** 
(0.043) 
.0226 -2.02 
FAMILY -.1013 
(0.367) 
.1122 -0.90 
FSIZE .4701*** 
(0.000) 
.0297 15.83 
LEV .0002 
(0.661) 
.0004 0.44 
MB -.0358** 
(0.012) 
.0143 -2.51 
AGE -.0102*** 
(0.000) 
.0020 -4.96 
ROA .0071** 
(0.019) 
.0030 2.34 
C -8.370*** 
(0.000) 
.3747 -22.33 
 
N 2335 F-Statitics 62.37 
R2 .349 p>F .000 
Notes: This table reports the results of industry and year fixed effects. 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
The results presented above have not considered potential endogeneity that may exist in corporate governance 
variables. For the purpose, we employed an instrumental variable approach, namely the two-stage least square 
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regression (2SLS). Following (Cao et al., 2018), the study uses the industry average board size as an instrumental 
variable to precisely estimate synchronicity. We use board size for two reasons; one, board size exhibits variations 
across twelve different industries used in our sample. The other, it is unlikely that the average industry board size can 
be correlated with the measure of informativeness. In the first stage regression, we regressed the average industry 
board size on corporate governance variables. In the second stage regression, the model use predicted board size along 
with our other variables in the original model. Table 5 presents the 2SLS results using predicted values of board size. 
Our results largely remain robust to using instrumental variables, except the board size turned significant. We already 
explained the presence of the free-rider effect might cause the larger board to positively contribute firm synchronicity.  
 
Table 5: Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH Coefficients. Std. Error t-statistics 
BSIZE 
(Predicted) 
.4075* 
(0.053) 
.2105 1.94 
CEO -.1938 
(0.130) 
.1279 -1.52 
BCOM .0001 
(0.965) 
.0026 0.04 
INSTOWN .4486** 
(0.036) 
.2144 2.09 
BLOCK -.0649*** 
(0.009) 
.0249 -2.60 
FAMILY .0917 
(0.546) 
.1517 0.60 
FSIZE .3718*** 
(0.000) 
.0574 6.48 
LEV -.0005 
(0.285) 
.0005 -1.07 
MB -.0463*** 
(0.003) 
.0158 -2.93 
AGE -.0124*** 
(0.000) 
.00245 -5.05 
ROA .0065** 
(0.029) 
.0029819 2.19 
N 2335 F-Statitics 59.30 
R2 .299 p>F .000 
 
Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and stock price informativeness in a 
unique setting of an emerging market. Emerging markets are usually characterized by poor governance and 
information environment. The poor information environment results in higher volatility unrelated to firm 
fundamentals, higher risk, and lower investment efficiency. We documented how effective corporate governance 
helps to improve the information environment? We find that controlling shareholders in the form of block holding 
plays an effective role in improving informativeness. Due to the presence of these block ownership, the institutional 
investors remain largely short term investors and act passively. This behavior of institutional investors encourages 
managers to extract more cash flows leading to higher synchronicity. In our case, due to the free-rider effect, board 
size and composition do not act as monitoring agents and have no role in improving informativeness. These findings 
suggest market regulators develop such a corporate governance mechanism that not only ensures investor protection 
but also enjoin firms to reduce information asymmetry by better disclosure and transparency. More specifically, in the 
Pakistani context, traditional corporate governance mechanisms through board room regulations may not improve 
informativeness, and regulators need to regulate the ownership regulations, including family ownership and 
controlling shareholders. Moreover, steps need to be taken to encourage institutional investors to participate actively 
through maintaining their stakes for longer time periods.   
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Appendix 1: Sampling Firms 
a) Sector-wise distribution of sample firms 
 
b) All Companies Included in Sample 
Industr
y 
Company Name Industr
y 
Company 
Name 
Indust
ry 
Company Name 
1 Ahmed Hassan 
Textile Mills Ltd. 
2 Ansari Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Bestway Cement Ltd. 
1 Ali Asghar Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
2 Baba Farid 
Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 Cherat Cement Co. 
Ltd. 1 Allawasaya Textile 
& Finishing Mills 
2 Chashma 
Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 D.G. Khan Cement 
Co. Ltd. 1 Artist c Denim Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Colony Sugar
Mills Ltd. 
5 Dandot Cement Co. 
Ltd. 1 Ashfaq Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Dewan Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Dewan Cement Ltd. 
(Pakland Cement) 1 Asim Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Faran Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Fauji Cement Co. 
Ltd. 1 Azgard Nine Ltd. 2 Habib Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Fecto Cement Ltd. 
1 Babri Cotton Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Haseeb 
Waqas Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Flying Cement Ltd. 
1 Bhanero Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
2 Husein 5 Gharibwal Cement 
Ltd. 1 Bilal Fibres Ltd. 2 JDW Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Kohat Cement Co. 
Ltd. 1 Blessed Textiles 
Ltd. 
2 ehran 
Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 ucky Cement Ltd. 
1 Chakwal Spinning 
Mills Ltd. 
2 Mirpurkhas 
Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 Maple Leaf Cement 
Factory Ltd. 1 Co ony Mills Ltd. 
(Colony Textile) 
2 Mirza Sugar
Mills Ltd. 
5 Pioneer Cement Ltd. 
1 Crescent Fibers Ltd. 
(Crescent Boa 
2 Noon Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Thatta Cement Ltd. 
1 D.M. Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Sakrand 
Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 Balochistan Glass 
Ltd. 1 D.S. Industries Ltd. 2 anghar 
Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 Ghani Glass Ltd. 
1 Dawood 
Lawrencepur Ltd. 
2 hahmurad 
Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 Ghani Value Glass 
Ltd. 1 De an Farooque 
Spinning Mills Ltd. 
2 hahtaj Sugar
Mills Ltd. 
5 Karam Ceramics Ltd. 
1 Dewan Khalid 
Textile Mills Ltd. 
2 Shakarganj 
Mills Ltd. 
5 Safe Mix Concrete 
Products Ltd. 1 D wan Mushtaq 
Textile Mills Ltd. 
2 The Premier 
Sugar Mills 
& Distille 
5 Shabbir Tiles And 
Ceramics Ltd. 1 D wan Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
2 The Thal
Industries
Corporation 
Ltd. 
5 Ta iq Glass 
Industries Ltd. 1 Din Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Clove  
Pakistan Ltd. 
6 Agriauto Industries 
Ltd. 1 Elahi Cotton Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Ismail 
In ustries 
Ltd. 
6 Al-Ghazi Tractors 
Ltd. 1 Ellcot Spinning 
Mills Ltd. 
2 Mitchell'S 
Fruit Farms 
Ltd. 
6 Atlas Battery Ltd. 
1 Faisal Spinning 
Mills Ltd. 
2 M rree 
Brewery Co. 
Ltd. 
6 Atlas Honda Ltd. 
1 Fazal Cloth Mills 
Ltd. 
2 National
Foods Ltd. 
6 Baluchistan Wheels 
Ltd. 1 Feroze1888 Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Nestle 
Pakistan Ltd. 
6 Bolan Castings Ltd. 
1 Gadoon Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
2 Noon 
Pakistan Ltd. 
6 Dewan Farooque 
Motors Ltd. 
Industry  Industry Name Number of Firms 
1 Textile 85 
2 Food 36 
3 Chemicals, Chemical Products & Pharma 37 
4 Other Manufacturing 17 
5 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products - Overall 22 
6 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Auto parts 18 
7 Fuel & Energy 14 
8 Information, Comm. and Transport Services 10 
9 Coke & Refined Petroleum Products 9 
10 Paper, Paperboard and Products 6 
11 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 5 
12 Other Services Activities 5 
 Total 264 
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1 Hafiz Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
2 Punjab Oil 
Mills Ltd. 
6 Exide Pakistan Ltd. 
1 Haji Mohammad 
Ismail Mills Ltd. 
2 Quice Food 
Industries 
Ltd. 
6 General Tyre & 
Rubber Co. Ltd. 1 Hal  Enterprises 
Ltd. 
2 Rafhan 
Maize 
Products Co. 
Ltd. 
6 Ghandhara In ustries 
Ltd. 1 Hira Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
2 She an 
Interna ional 
6 Ghandhara Nissan 
Ltd. 1 ICC Textiles Ltd. 2 Unilever 
Pakistan 
Foods Ltd. 
(Rafh 
6 Ghani Automobiles 
Industries Ltd. 1 Idrees Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Abbo t 
Laboratories 
P kistan) 
Ltd 
6 Hinopak Motors Ltd. 
1 Island Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Agritech Ltd. 6 Honda Atlas Cars 
(Pakistan) Ltd. 1 J.A Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Bawany Air 
Products Ltd. 
6 Indus Motor Co. Ltd. 
1 J.K Spinning Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Berger Paints 
Pakistan Ltd. 
6 Millat Tractors Ltd. 
1 Janana De Malucho 
Textile Mills Lt 
3 Biafo 
Industries 
Ltd. 
6 Pak Suzuki Motor 
Co. Ltd. 1 Jubile Spinning & 
Weaving Mills L 
3 Buxly Paints 6 Sazgar Engineering 
Works Ltd. 1 Khalid Siraj Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Colgate-
Palmolive 
(Pakistan) 
Ltd. 
7 Altern Energy Ltd. 
1 Kohat Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Data Agro 
Ltd. 
7 Burshane LPG 
(Pakistan) Ltd. (form 1 Kohinoor Mills Ltd. 3 Dawood 
Hercules 
Chemicals 
Ltd. 
7 Japan P wer 
Generation Ltd. 1 Kohinoor Spinning 
Mills Ltd. 
3 D s on 
(Pvt) Ltd. 
(Nimir 
7 Karachi Electric 
Supply Co. Ltd. 1 Kohinoor Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Descon 
Oxychem td
7 Kohinoor Energy 
Ltd. 1 Landmark Spinning 
Industries Ltd. 
3 Dewan 
Sal an Fibre 
Ltd. 
7 Mari Gas Co. Ltd. 
1 Mahmood Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Dyne  
Pakistan Ltd. 
7 Nishat Chunian 
Power Ltd. 1 aqbool Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Engro 
Corporation 
Ltd. 
7 Nishat Power Ltd. 
1 asood Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Engr  
Polymer & 
Chemicals 
Ltd. 
7 Oil & Gas 
Development Co. 
Ltd. (OG 
1 an Textile 
Industries Ltd. 
3 Fatima 
Fertilizer Co. 
7 Sitara Energy Ltd. 
1 Nadeem Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
3 auji 
Fertilizer Bin 
Qasim Ltd. 
7 Southern Electric 
Power Co. Ltd. 1 Nagina Cotton Mills 
Ltd. 
3 auji 
Fert lizer Co. 
Ltd. 
7 Sui Northern Gas 
Pipelines Ltd. 1 Nishat (Chunian) 
Ltd. 
3 Ghan  Gases 7 Sui Southern Gas Co. 
Ltd. 1 Nishat Mills Ltd. 3 GlaxoSmithK
line 
(Pakistan) 
Ltd. 
7 The Hub Power Co. 
Ltd. 1 Olympia Spinning & 
Weaving Mills L 
3 Highnoon 
Laboratories 
8 HUM Network Ltd. 
1 Prosperity Weaving 
Mills Ltd. 
3 ICI P kistan 
t . 
8 Media Times Ltd. 
1 Quetta Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 It ehad 
Chemicals 
Ltd. 
8 Pak Datacom Ltd. 
1 Ravi Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Leiner Pak 
Gelatine Ltd. 
8 Pakistan Int. 
Container Ltd. 1 Redco Textiles Ltd. 3 inde 
Pakistan Ltd. 
(Boc 
Pakistan) 
8 Pakistan 
International Airlines 
Co 
1 Reliance Cotton 
Spinning Mills Ltd 
3 Lotte 
Pakistan PTA 
Ltd.(P kistan 
P 
8 Pakist n Natio al
Shipping Corpora 1 Reliance Weaving 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Nimir 
In u trial 
Chemicals 
Ltd. 
8 Pakistan 
Telecommunication 
Co. Ltd 
1 Saif Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 a is a  
Gum & 
Chemicals 
Ltd. 
8 RG Pakistan L d. 
1 Sajjad Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 akistan PVC
t . 
8 Telecard Ltd. 
1 Salfi Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Sanofi 
Aventis 
(Aventis 
Pharma) 
8 Worldcall Telecom 
Ltd. 1 Sally Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
3 Sardar 
Chemical 
Industries 
Ltd. 
9 Attock Petroleum 
Ltd. 1 Salman Noman 
Enterprises Ltd. 
3 Searle 
aki an Ltd. 
9 Attock Refinery Ltd. 
1 Samin Textiles Ltd. 3 S affi 
Chemical 
Industries 
Ltd. 
9 Byco Petroleum 
(BosicorPakistan L 1 Sana Industries Ltd. 3 Sitara 
Chemical 
In ustries 
Ltd. 
9 National Refinery 
Ltd. 1 Sapphire Fibres Ltd. 3 Sitara 
Peroxid  Ltd. 
9 Pakistan Oilfields 
Ltd. 1 Sapphire Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Wah Nobel 
Chemicals 
Ltd. 
9 Pakistan Petroleum 
Ltd. 1 Sargodha Spinning 
Mills Ltd. 
3 Wyeth 
Pakistan Ltd. 
9 Pakistan Refinery 
Ltd. 1 Service Industries 
Textiles Ltd. 
4 B ta Pakistan 
Ltd. 
9 Pakistan State Oil 
Co. Ltd. 1 Shadab Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
4 Crescent 
Steel & 
Allied 
Products L 
9 Shell Pakistan Ltd. 
1 Shahtaj Textile Ltd. 4 Dadex Eternit
Ltd. 
10 Century Paper & 
Board Mills Ltd. 1 Shahzad Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
4 Dost Steels 
Ltd. 
10 Che at Packaging 
Ltd. 1 Shams Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
4 Ec  Pack 
Ltd.  
10 Merit Packaging Ltd. 
1 Sunrays Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
4 Emco 
Industries 
Ltd. 
10 Packages Ltd. 
1 Suraj Cotton Mills 
Ltd. 
4 Gillet e 
Pakistan Ltd. 
10 Pakistan Paper 
Products Ltd. 1 Tata Textile Mills 
Ltd. 
4 Huffaz 
Seamless 
Pipe 
Industries Lt 
10 Security Papers Ltd. 
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1 The Crescent Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
4 KSB Pumps 
Co. Ltd. 
11 Ados Pakistan Ltd. 
1 Zephyr Textiles Ltd. 4 Pakistan
Tobacco Co. 
Ltd. 
11 Pak Elektron Ltd. 
1 Gul Ahmed Textile 
Mills Ltd. 
4 Philip Morris
(Pakistan) 
Ltd. 
11 Pakistan Cables Ltd. 
1 Al-Abid Silk Mills 
Ltd. 
4 Serv ce 
In ustries 
Ltd. 
11 Siemens (Pakistan) 
Engineering Co. 1 Bannu Woollen 
Mills Ltd. 
4 Si diqsons 
Tin Plate 
11 Singer Pakistan Ltd. 
1 Crescent Jute 
Products Ltd. 
4 reet 
Corporation 
Ltd. 
12 IBL HealthCare Ltd. 
1 Ibrahim Fibres Ltd. 4 Tri-Pack 
Films Ltd. 
12 Javedan Corporation 
Ltd. (formerly 2 Adam Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
4 United 
Brands 
Ltd.(Udl 
Industries 
12 Pace (Pakistan) Ltd. 
2 Al-Abbas Sugar 
Mills Ltd. 
4 ZIL Ltd. 
(Zulfeqar 
Ltd. 
12 Pakistan Services 
Ltd. 2 Al-Noor Sugar Mills 
Ltd. 
5 Attock 
Cement 
Pakistan Ltd. 
12 Shifa International 
Hospitals Ltd.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
